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MICHAEL A PETERS
AFTERWORD
EMOTIONAL REASON: CHALLENGING COGNITIVISM IN EDUCATION
In 2004 R. W. Picard and nine colleagues at the MIT Media Lab published “Affective 
Learning – A Manifesto” that registered a challenge to cognitive theories recognizing 
the way that the computer as model and metaphor had tended to skew research on 
learning as a form of information processing by privileging the “cognitive” over 
the “affective.” The manifesto attempted to redress the imbalance to support an 
increasingly research-based “view of affect as complexly intertwined with cognition 
in guiding rational behaviour, memory retrieval, decision-making, creativity, and 
more” (Picard, 2004). They wanted to build new learning systems that used affect as 
a basis for new education and machine learning. They noted that “the extension of 
cognitive theory to explain and exploit the role of affect in learning is in its infancy.”
Educational research lagged far behind the latest neuro-biological and evolutionary 
findings and had considerable difficulty translating scientific studies into classroom 
practice. Studies attempting to recognise the role of emotions in learning could do 
no better than proclaiming “Emotions affect learning” advising that teachers need 
to understand how their students’ emotions affect learning and make judgments 
about when emotions are interfering with or supporting learning. In this context 
educational researchers also jumped on the “emotional intelligence’ bandwagon and 
used the concept to advise teachers to help their students “manage their emotions”. 
The emphasis also fell on creating “emotionally safe learning environments” where 
students felt safe and could take risks to develop their learning confidence.1
By 2014 Reinhart Pekrun (2014) could make an argument for the central place of 
emotions in the classroom:
The classroom is an emotional place. Students frequently experience 
emotions in classroom settings. For example, students can be excited during 
studying, hope for success, feel pride in their accomplishments, be surprised 
at discovering a new solution, experience anxiety about failing examinations, 
feel ashamed over poor grades, or be bored during lessons. In addition, social 
emotions play a role as well, like admiration, empathy, anger, contempt, or 
envy concerning peers and teachers. Moreover, students bring emotions to the 
classroom that concern events outside the school, but can nevertheless have a 
strong influence upon their learning, such as the emotional turmoil produced 
by stress within the family.
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Emotions control the students’ attention, influence their motivation to learn, 
modify the choice of learning strategies, and affect their self-regulation of 
learning. Furthermore, emotions are part of students’ identity, and they affect 
personality development, psychological health and physical health. From an 
educational perspective, emotions are important because of their influence on 
learning and development, but students’ emotional well-being should also be 
regarded as an educational goal that is important in itself.
Focusing on emotions that students experience at school Pekrun (2014) proposed 
ten principles that cover the nature and diversity of students’ emotions, functions, 
antecedents, and the regulation of emotions, and the role of education in modifying 
emotions, including the influence of teachers, classrooms, schools, peers and the 
family. On the basis of the research he distinguishes four major kinds of academic 
emotions: Achievement emotions that relate to student success and failure; epistemic 
emotions largely cognitive that surround problem solving including surprise, 
curiosity, confusion, and delight; topic emotions pertaining to lessons including 
emotions like empathy, anxiety and, or aesthetic enjoyment; social emotions relating 
to teachers and peers “such as love, sympathy, compassion, admiration, contempt, 
envy, anger or social anxiety”.
Educational neuroscience studying the learning brain is identifying core concepts 
and principles at the heart of the emerging field:
• Human development is shaped by a synergy of biology and experience
• Emotion is fundamental to learning
• There are developmental sensitivities for certain aspects of language learning
• The literate brain can be created through multiple developmental pathways 
Mathematics is created in the brain with biology and instruction (Hinton et al., 
2008: 87).
In the early attempts this century to examine the significance of emotions in 
learning their role was not as a central part of reason and rationality, as part of 
cognitive development. This was a brave attempt to recognize emotions but it did not 
try to theoretically rework the cognitive paradigm that was responsible for excluding 
the emotions to start with.
Thomas Dixon (2012) has mapped the history of “emotion” as a keyword in crisis 
from the point at which William James wrote an influential article for Mind called 
“What is an Emotion?” in 1884. He comments “Before then, relevant mental states 
were categorised variously as “appetites,” “passions,” “affections,” or “sentiments” 
(p. 388). James, like Wittgenstein later, was trying to establish or define a 
psychological category and examine its meaning and he theorized emotion as a direct 
perception of some object in the world. James and the founders of the discipline of 
psychology bequeathed the discipline and related areas a set of inherited confusions 
between mind and body, thought and feeling that bedevilled the profession thereafter 
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and gave way to an even more diversified semantic and cultural history that seems to 
threaten the scientific operationalization of the concept.
Certainly the classical cognitivist account has become increasingly problematic 
not least because of the tendency to treat the individuals’ cognitive processes in 
isolation from the thinking of others and from their environment, downplaying the 
influence of the dimension of collective intelligence, the role of collective emotions 
and overlooking the role of environmental factors in cognitive development.2 These 
criticisms have led to new paradigms of embodied cognition and the extended 
mind, both of which open up the possibility for recognizing more formally the role 
of emotions in cognition and cognitive development. Both views have begun to 
emphasize goal-directed interactions between individuals and their environment in 
a problem-solving orientation against the classic cognitive paradigm that defines 
cognition in terms of the formal logic of rule-following and information processing 
that assumes a computational model of rationality. This postulate of a sort of internal 
set of brain processes unaffected by the environment excludes the role of emotion 
and makes it difficult to account for any collective dimension of intelligence or 
imagination.
The Cambridge Embodied Cognition and Emotion Lab assumes “First, cognition 
is grounded in actual bodily states, and second, many cognitive processes serve 
the broader goal of facilitating action in a specific environment.”3 Their work has 
explored various dimensions of embodied cognition in a number of interdependent 
contexts: The Body and the Social World: Embodied Morality where research 
supports the idea that moral judgement is driven by intuitive processes rather 
than deliberate reasoning in which emotion plays a fundamental role; The Body 
and the Physical World: Embodied Perception where findings indicate that “even 
perceptions of physical space turn out to depend on the social and emotional context” 
and, Embodied Metaphors, where “a certain set of basic bodily experiences that 
are essential in providing basic cognitive metaphors.” In regard to the latter, Simon 
Schnall (2012) writes:
In contrast to traditional theories of cognition, according to embodied 
approaches, cognitive processes do not have the goal of arriving at a mirror 
image of the world, but rather, cognitive processes allow humans to successfully 
act in their physical and social world. Thus, one of the main assumptions of 
embodied cognition is that the human body constrains action and its regulation, 
and as a consequence, produces a cognitive apparatus that facilitates action.
As Schnall explains the early work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) on cognitive 
metaphors largely confined to linguistics has been confirmed in other areas of social 
experience confirming the metaphoric basis of many cognitive processes.4
Recent research examines the extension of theories of embodied cognition to 
the study of emotion and emotion knowledge such as the ways in which emotion 
concepts are supported by simulation in sensory-motor systems, the influences of 
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emotion in processes as the encoding of words, lexical access, and the perception 
of faces, and the ways ‘emotions have important relations to processes of attention, 
memory, and are constituted in part by physiological processes, all of which are 
inputs to the mechanisms that support the subjective experience of time”5
Giovanna Colombetti writes of the 4E approach to the mind: embodied, embedded, 
enactive and extended.6 She argues:
My own view is that the embodied-mind perspective ought to give up on this 
dichotomy of the body vs. cognition that is still influential in emotion theory 
and affective science. Instead, we should characterize the cognitive aspects of 
emotion as embodied, and the bodily aspects of emotion as cognitive.
Increasingly, both philosophical and psychological studies are ridding themselves of 
the old dualisms inherited from Cartesian culture to look at more radical interactive 
embodied accounts of cognition, rationality and learning that do not privilege 
formal calculative rationality but rather recognize the essential role that emotions 
play in thinking and learning. Education has tended to lag behind many of these 
developments and also has great difficulty in translating research on embodied 
emotions as an approach to cognition in a way that impacts on practices.
This is the significance of Birthe Lund and Tatiana Chemi’s edited collection. It 
brings the role of the emotions in education centre stage and engages a in thematic 
research project to explore educational contexts that work with innovative settings 
and the emotional side of learning and teaching and the special significance 
of emotions in the act of creation and new thinking. In one sense the reversal of 
hierarchical binary that was the controlling principle for Cartesian culture has not 
yet taken place. Cognitivism is still trying to adopt an approach to thinking and 
rationality that allows for emotion as a supplement rather than re-siting the problem 
altogether to acknowledge that the embodiedness of all human functioning in radical 
interaction with the environment – a philosophical view that stems from Darwin to 
be taken up by Heidegger, Dewey and Vygotsky – does not privilege thought over 
feeling, or cognition over emotions but recognizes that these dualisms disappear in 
the biological systems of the body as it interacts in dynamical and self-organising 
ways with its changing environment. Lund and Chemi’s book recognises the 
new emphasis on the emotions in the innovative economy and the necessity for 
educationalists – researchers, teachers, and policy makers – to understand how the 
emotions contribute to artistic endeavour, to creative and innovation practice, and 
also to a new positive view of the emotions in learning and education.
NOTES
1 See for instance the session called “Feelings Count: Emotions and Learning” developed by Linda 
Darling-Hammond, Suzanne Orcutt, Karen Strobel, Elizabeth Kirsch, Ira Lit, and Daisy Martin With 
Contributions From James Comer, M.D., Stanford University School of Education




4 Schnall cites the work of Landau, Meier, & Keefer (2010).
5 See the Niedenthal Emotions Lab at http://psych.wisc.edu/niedenthal/research.html
6 See http://www.hdc.ed.ac.uk/seminars/emotions-body-and-world.
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